Exhibit 2

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND CLAUDIA ENGELHORN, et al,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Case Number: C-24-CV-24-002631

ERIK BOLOG, et al.,

Defendant.

REPORTER'S OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (Motion's Hearing)

Baltimore, Maryland

Monday, January 27, 2025

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE JEFFREY GELLER, Associate Judge

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

PATRICK GARDNER, ESQUIRE

For the Defendants, Whiteford, Taylor, and Preston:

JOHN J. CONNOLLY, ESQUIRE WILLIAM J. MURPHY, ESQUIRE

For the Defendant Erik Bolog individually and as Trustee for the Jareb Irrevocable Trust Agreement; Science Park Associates, LLC; and Darnestown Road, Inc. et al.:

DOUGLAS GANSLER, ESQUIRE J.B. HOWARD, ESQUIRE ZACK SCHRIEBER, ESQUIRE

* Remote Electronic Proceedings Digitally Recorded *

Transcribed by:
Patricia Trikeriotis
Chief Court Reporter
111 N. Calvert Street
Suite 619, Cummings Courthouse
Baltimore, Maryland 21202

1	Plaintiff.
2	But that's not what we're technically doing
3	here. We're asserting that there's, again, this this
4	agreement is not, apparently, not a written one. So to
5	the extent that there's attorney-client agreements can
6	be created in common law as well, and implied in fact as
7	well, and an express written contract.
8	And then I would just note, yes, in closing,
9	the Maryland and position of the Maryland Ethics opinion
10	Bar Ethics Committee remains that, since 1990, that
11	attorney attorney-client arbitration agreements are
12	improper unless the client is informed of the has
13	is independently represented with respect to making that
14	agreement.
15	And then just checking the last of my notes
16	here.
17	Yeah, unless the Court has any other questions.
18	THE COURT: No. I don't have any questions.
19	Do counsel for Mr. Bolog want to chime in on
20	the arbitration piece?
21	MR. GANSLER: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. And
22	good morning.
23	I just want, for the record, this is Douglas
24	Gansler, counsel for Mr. Bolog and the entities, joined

by my colleagues, J.B. Howard and Zack Schreiber on the

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Zoom call.

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Your Honor, the question -- I suppose the answer to that is, Mr. Bolog, nor any of his entities, ever signed any arbitration agreement of any type. So were this Court to send the case to arbitration, we would not be involved.

With that said, moving on to the discussion we just heard, we would agree with Mr. Connolly that this is an easy decision for Your Honor. This case should not go to arbitration. And the reason why that is, is because the sole arbitration clause that occurred in this case is in fact the retainer letter regarding -- and it says, "regarding all claims regarding the estate of Curt Engelhorn." I'm looking at the February 20th, 2020 version. They're basically all the same in regard to arbitration and the scope of the sole, what they call retainer letter -- we call it engagement letter, same thing -- is that, "You have chosen to engage Whiteford, Taylor, and Preston to provide legal services in connection with your potential claims against the estate of Curt Engelhorn and potential other persons who may come to our attention through the investigation into this matter relating to your forced heir rights or other rights you may have concerning the trust established by him."

1 By the time the gift was made or any of the 2 transactions in this case occurred, that case was long 3 over, right for Taylor got its \$4 million, Ms. Englehorn got her \$130 million as a result of the settlement of 4 5 that case, of the Swiss litigation case. So -- and there 6 exists no other retainer letters regarding any other of 7 these matters, so that's it. I mean, it's that simple. 8 It's clearly -- look, had there been a 9 disagreement or an issue that had come up during the 10 course of the Swiss litigation, then of course this exegesis regarding Colorado versus Maryland law and the 11 12 Rules of Professional Conduct and all those things would 13 come into play. But here, there is no arbitration clause 14 relevant to any of the issues that are brought in the 15 complaint by the Plaintiff. So we have no we have no dog 16 in the fight, but it seems clear to me that there is no 17 fight. 18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 19 Back to Mr. Connelly. 20 MR. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, I was on mute. 21 apologize. 22 With respect to what Mr. Gansler just said, I'm 23 not sure I fully understand it, but it's contrary to what 24 he wrote. If he's saying that the arbitration clause

does not apply to the current dispute, he's totally

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1	I do think this is an easy case. There's an
2	arbitration agreement with a broad arbitration provision
3	that covers all counts of the complaint, and the Court
4	should order arbitration, and other issues can be
5	resolved by arbitrators, as they are every day in cases
6	all across the country by arbitrators, in accordance with
7	the public policy of all 50 states in the U.S.
8	government. So I would ask that the Court grant the
9	petition to compel.
L 0	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
L1	So taking this a piece at a
L2	MR. GANSLER: I'm sorry. This is Doug Gansler.
L3	Can I just respond in 30 seconds?
L 4	THE COURT: Go ahead.
L 5	MR. GANSLER: Thank you.
L 6	I just responded to Mr. Connolly's discussion
L 7	that about the language of the arbitration agreement,
L 8	which does say, "Any claim or dispute arising out of or
L 9	relating to this agreement, our services under it, or our
20	relationship with you will be resolved by final and
21	binding arbitration," blah, blah.
22	If the suggestion is correct that that somehow
23	anything outside of the Swiss litigation is subject to
24	arbitration, despite not having any arbitration
25	agreements anywhere else on any of the matters, then that

would -- which seems pretty obvious that it does not.

That would render the language before, the "or anything to do with our relationship with you," that -- they wouldn't put that in there. It would say -- where it says, "any claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement," it would -- there would be no need for that or "our services under it," would be -- would be superfluous, and it would -- it wouldn't make sense as an English construct.

And I guess what it -- what they seem to be saying -- what Mr. Connelly's argument seems to be saying is that by signing this one retainer agreement that exists between Whiteford Taylor, Mr. Bolog, and Ms. Engelhorn, that's the sole one that exists. That by saying that any our relationship with you will be resolved, any subsequent, any case, any relationship, any -- any interaction between Ms. Engelhorn and the law firm is going to be resolved by arbitration has to be their argument, and obviously that makes no sense. So I would just add those to our original thoughts.

THE COURT: Mr. Connolly, since it's your motion, I'll go back to you for the last word.

MR. CONNOLLY: Well, I mean, again, I'd encourage you to read what Mr. Gansler actually wrote in his paper, which is completely contrary to this. But

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There was a statement that this existence of an oral agreement between Bolog and the Plaintiff was something that I had raised for the first time here. It's something that they put in their answers or responses to requests for admission, which we provided, and it's Exhibit B to our opposition. That Whiteford, Taylor, and Preston put in their responses to our request for admissions. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Connolly, anything else

since it's is your motion? You get the last word.

MR. CONNOLLY: No, Your Honor. It is true that we -- that we included references to that agreement, but it's not true that that undoes the arbitration agreement in any particular.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So having considered the filings of the parties, as well as the argument presented thus far this morning, I'm going to give you a decision on the arbitration motion.

So obviously, the parties have disagreed as to what state's law applies to the analysis. This Court finds that Maryland law applies. First, it's not entirely clear to me that Ms. Engelhorn signed the contract in Colorado. Even if she did, as the Supreme Court of Maryland held in Laboratory Corporation of America versus Hood, 395 Md. 606, 621, quote, "The lex

loci contractus principle is not inflexible, and that it does not apply to a contract provision which is against public policy," unquote.

In Bethlehem Steel versus G.C. Zarnas and Company, 304 Md. 183 at 188, the court noted that, quote, "Merely because Maryland law is dissimilar to the law of another jurisdiction does not render the latter contrary to Maryland public policy, and that for another state's law to be unenforceable, there must be a strong public policy against enforcement in Maryland."

The Court does find that there's a strong public policy in favor of applying Maryland law in this case. That policy would exist within the Rules of Professional Conduct that apply to attorneys practicing in this State. I think Plaintiff's counsel had cited the Post vs. Bregman case, 349 Md. 142, that that the Rules of Professional Conduct are, in fact, a statement of public policy that have the force of law.

So with the Maryland Rules of Professional

Conduct standing as a backdrop of what public policy is
in the State as it pertains to attorney conduct, as it's
been noted, the Rules 19-301.8(h)(1) clearly prohibits
agreements limiting an attorney's prospective liability
to a client without the client being represented
independently or being advised in writing of the

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1	desirability to seek an independent counsel, which was
2	not done in this matter, the Court so finds.
3	Furthermore, even if I was to apply Colorado
4	law, as Whiteford, Taylor, and Preston argues, I would
5	still find the provision to be unenforceable. And if I
6	found that the law of the District of Columbia applied,
7	I'd reach the same result.
8	This is because the Court finds that Plaintiff
9	Engelhorn was not fully informed about the scope and
10	effect of the agreement. So for these reasons, the
11	Court's going to deny Whiteford, Taylor, Preston's Motion
12	to Compel Arbitration.
13	So let's turn to the Motions to Dismiss on
14	substantive grounds. And what I'd like to do is I'll
15	hear from both defense counsel, let Mr. Connolly respond
16	to all of it, and then turn back to defense counsel, go
17	in that direction.
18	So any references to who goes first?
19	MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, I'm William Murphy,
20	also representing Whiteford. I was going to argue the
21	Motion to Dismiss that Whiteford has filed.
22	THE COURT: Okay, well, I'll hear from you
23	first, and then I'll turn it over to the Bolog
24	Defendants.
25	MR. MURPHY: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.